Can Marxism explain economic crises?
Comparison Asian and Sub-prime mortgage crises
Author: Tomas Freitas
Introduction
The first economic crisis broke out in the year 1815, followed by 1825, 1836, 1847, 1857, 1866, 1873, 1882, and 1891 and again in 1895. The alternation between prosperity and crisis had become a regular occurrence between 1873 and 1895. Another crisis occurred again in 1907 (Kautsky, 1911, 12). However, why were those crises so very extensive affecting the whole of society at regular periods? This short essay will not discuss the historical background of these various crises as has been discussed by Kautsky, but will examine two recent crises which occurred in East Asia in 1997 and in the United States just recently in 2008. This short essay will attempt to link the Sub-prime mortgage crises and Marx theories of economic crises.
After the Asian monetary crisis of the mid-1990s, the economic crisis has returned and is affecting the global economy, global financial markets, companies, banks, and jobs. Global stock markets have declined, big financial institutions have shrunk or been bought out, millions of workers have lost their jobs and governments in even the wealthiest countries have had to respond with economic stimulus packages. However, what are the causes of this crisis? And why the Marxist tendency questions the crises rather than the recovery? These questions challenge the main hypotheses of Marx economic theory in explaining economic crises. This essay will present a number of contradictory arguments around the proposition that Marxism can explain economic crises.
Do these phenomena correspond to Marxist theory of the failure of capitalism? How do these crises correlate with Marx’ criticism of capitalism? Can Marx prove his theories of economic crises? This essay will explore the relevance of these notions to reality in the 21st century.
Marx Theories of Economic Crises
There are three distinct theories of crises that Marx strongly believes in which are discussed in detail in Capital II and III. Those theories are the theory of ‘disproportionalities’, the theory of, ‘the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (TRPF)’ and the theory of ‘underconsumption’. To understand how those theories work, Marx has illustrated three components to analyse total value of goods and services produced in each industry in a capitalist economy. These components include ‘Constant capital (c)’ the value of all means of production in other words is as an instrument of labour such as capital goods, like buildings, machinery and labouring animals etc., and circulating constant capital, such as raw and auxiliary materials, semi-finished products, etc. ‘Variable capital (v), so far as its value is concerned, is equal to the value of the social labour-power employed; in other words, it consists of the labour-power in action, is the direct contribution of the workforce. The third item, ‘Surplus value(s) ’, is that part of the total value created that is used by the employer (Marx, 1885).
Frank Stilwell in his book Political Economy: The Contest of Economic Ideas (2002), has simplified some of Marx’ terminologies such as ‘disproportionalities’. This terminology officially refers to inequalities among the two sectors. It is the Marxist economic model to scrutinize the crucial circumstances for reproduction and growth of the economy, for instance dividing into two groups according to whether they produce capital goods (Department 1) or consumer goods (Department 2): Department 1: total value = c1 + v1 + s1 and Department 2: total value = c2 + v2 + s2 . Marx argued that the economy can reproduce itself if the two conditions met each other. The first condition is that the value of capital goods which has been used in the production process during any time period (c1 + c2) must be matched by new disbursements on capital goods (c1 + v1 + s1): (c1 + c2) = (c1 + v1 + s1). If this condition is met, the ability production of industry is sustained. The second condition is that total non-refundable incomes of the workers (v1 + v2) and the capitalists (s1 + s2) should be equal to the value of the output of consumer goods (c1 + v1 + s1): v1 + v2 + s1 + s2 = c2 + v2 + s2. If this condition is met, all the commodities made will be sold (Marx cited in Stilwell, 2002, 122).
To illustrate the second theory of TRPF, Marx has used three important ratios defined as follows: s/v is the rate of surplus value (sometimes called rate of exploitation), c/v is the organic composition of capital: s / (c + v) is the rate of profit. This rate of profit can be expressed in terms of the rate of surplus value and the organic composition of capital by dividing each term in the numerator and denominator by v, that is: s / v divide into c / v + 1 But why does this rate of profit tend to fall as capital accumulation takes place? Consider the effect of a rise in c / v, caused by businesses installing more plants and machinery in their production processes (Marx cited in Stilwell, 2002, 139).
Marx’ third theory of crises is ‘underconsumptionist’ or ‘Overproduction’; this theory is not entirely Marx, but in different categories of analysis development, John Maynard Keynes and Kalecki (1971) also explain the problem of inadequacies in effective demand. This theory explains that the periods in which capitalist production applies all its forces are always phases of overproduction, because the forces of production can never be utilised beyond the point at which surplus value can be not only produced but also realised.
Correlation between theories and evidence
Asian Crises
As mentioned in the introduction, this essay will only examine two current crises, namely the East Asian crisis of 1997 and 2008 crisis in the United States caused by the collapse of sub-prime mortgages.
First, the Asian economic crisis, and some preliminary methodological remarks on what it means to “cause” a crisis. How did the East Asian miracle unravel into a deep crisis? Some arguments state that an important change was the detection of swift financial liberalisation and capital accounts opening without the development of strength supervision and regulation. There were difficulties faced by East Asian policymakers in coping with the in-flows of capital that resulted from rapid capital market liberalisation. And the ability to undertake preventative macroeconomic policy was not present (Berg, 1999).
An IMF working paper states:
The crises had their origins in fundamental deficiencies in the affected countries. In Thailand, some role was played by traditional macroeconomic problems, particularly current account deficits that became unsustainably large and an exchange rate that had become overvalued. Generally, though, the weaknesses in the crisis countries derived from the interaction of weak domestic financial institutions with large capital inflows (Berg, 1999, 3).
To simplify the IMF statement above, Bill Lucarelli has stated that the causes of the economic crises in Thailand, Indonesia, The Philippines and Korea is due to speculator attacks on their respective currencies (Lucarelli, 2008).
If we analyse the IMF statement above, it shows a mutual connection between investments in ‘large capital inflows’ and the Marxist theory of ‘TRPF’. It makes sense because those Asian countries invested enormous amount of equities in foreign financial markets with deficits in local currencies, and with a lack of supervision and regulation (traditional Macroeconomic theory), which is then easily attacked by speculators. In Thailand, the government tried to support their own national currency by selling dollars from its reserves, and buying up the local currency to sustain its value. But eventually, the government ran out of hard currency, there were no more dollars to sell, the currency plunged and the speculators were satisfied (Stiglitz, 2002). The former of the head of World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, states that: “I believe that capital account liberalisation was the single most important factor leading to the crisis” (2002, 99). He pointed out that the capital account liberalisation represents risk without return. Stiglitz (2002) also analysed that there has been a trend in the last quarter century for investors to prefer huge outflows to inflows.
Marx theory of TRPF can be seen in relation to the Asian crisis in that bankers bought more equities in foreign currencies, while their management was still in a process of improvement. On the other hand, governments held strong their national currency, but at the same time created deficits. And ‘capital account liberalisation’ can accumulate profit, however this leads to major consequences in a downturn.
Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis
So what are the causes of this 2008 crisis? One common approach has been to lay the blame on the collapse of sub-prime mortgage markets in the United States, which is a credit crisis in US mortgages investment. This has happened because faced with a loss of equity capital, banks are unwilling to make ordinary business loans. Without credit, many businesses are facing bankruptcy and liquidation. This means a rising rate of joblessness, reduced individual expenses rating, and declining industry revenues (Cobb, 2009).
Bill Lucarelli has described the sub-prime mortgage crisis as simple to follow. The commercial banks failed in properly monitoring the risk and value of the credit borrowers, which were sold to the secondary market in the form of collateralised debt obligation (CDO) assets. This meant that the conventional function of banks in examining risk was handed over to the prevailing credit agencies. The main reason for the banks doing this was to sell CDOs in order to accumulate a payment or a commission. In other words, financial deregulation permitted banks to issue credits and sell these assets into the second level of the markets, which were then renewed and mixed into other classes of financial assets (Lucarelli, 2008).
A similar perspective has been visualised by Jonathan Jarvis (2009) about the sub-prime mortgage credit crisis, starting with diversification of the CDOs into three different rates of categories: AAA for safe investments where interest rates are lower; category BBB called good investments; and category CCC, high risk investment that comes with high interest rates. The banks created category CCC because they had run out of the mortgage market for safe investment. However, category CCC was the one used to sell to lower-income families in the United States. This lower income family is called ‘sub-prime’, where the banks sell the entire category CCC. The banks also added high risk for new owners of sub-prime mortgage; no down payment, no free money and must have proof of income or the banks will take back the money. Then however when the banks try to re-sell the mortgage, it cannot be done because the mortgage price has dropped (Jarvis, 2009). Lower prices increase the necessity to sell and reinforce the excess supply, making it even more difficult for the investor to fully repay his/her loan from asset sales (Kregel, 2008).
The credit crisis in sub-prime mortgage became popular as a topic for economists to analyse the crisis. Aside from Lucarelli and Jarvis, Michael Dooley and Michael Hutchison have both provided strong analyses of this current crisis. They describe the sub-prime mortgage credit crisis as a result of ‘emerging markets’ which have had large impacts on Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads in emerging markets, which efficiently transmitted the financial crisis in the U.S. to markets abroad (Dooley & Hutchison, 2009).
If we analyse the chronologies of the credit crisis in the sub-prime mortgage industry, it shares a common understanding with the Marx theory of ‘underconsumption’ or ‘overproduction’, where the banks and the investors in mortgages in the United States ‘run out the market’ and try to re-sell it through the CDOs, failing at this however and finally resulting in bankruptcy which affected the entire global economy. Oversupply (overproduction) of housing was exacerbated when interest rates were increased and hundreds of thousands of lower middle income borrowers could no longer afford their mortgage payments and the houses came back onto the market (Gupta, 2008). Another once-popular theory was that a chronic problem of “under-consumption” the inability of households to purchase enough goods and services to utilise the economy’s productive capacity had exacerbated the slump (Bernanke, cited in Foster & Magdoff, 2009).
Conclusion
It is still unclear as per explanations from political economists as to why the economic crises occur periodically through the decades without any recipe for cure. There are many definitions of economic crisis, even to the extent that some political economists consider the crisis as whole cycle beginning from recession to recovery, with some only questioning recession rather than recovery. The international financial institutions still blame the Asian economic crises on a lack of experience in supervision and regulation which is a traditionally macroeconomic viewpoint. The same reasons have been applied to the credit crisis in subprime mortgages in the United States, which is lack of supervision by the commercial banks in controlling the credit agencies. Marxist classical theories of disproportionality seem to be correlated in the earlier years but have not really been discussed in relation to the more recent crises. However, this essay has attempted to demonstrate that Marx’ theory of ‘TRPF’ and ‘underconsumption or overproduction’ seem to have more of a place for debate as one of the unpredictable reasons relevant to contemporary economic crises.
References
Bellamy, F., & Magdoff, F., 2009. ‘Financial implosion and stagnation: Back to the real economy’. The Monthly Review. Available from: http://tomweston.net/FinStag.pdf
Berg, A., 1999. The Asia crisis: causes, policy responses, and outcomes. Social Science Research Network. Available from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=880665
Cobb, C., 2009. Editor’s Introduction. The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 68, No 4
Dooley, M & Hutchison, M., 2009. Transmission of the U.S. subprime crisis to emerging markets: Evidence on the decoupling–recoupling hypothesis. Journal of International Money and Finance. Volume 28, Issue 8, pp 1331-1349
Gupta, A., 2008. ‘How to Wreck the Economy’. The Independent. Available from: http://www.indypendent.org/2008/10/02/how-to-wreck-the-economy/
Jarvis, J., 2009. The crisis of credit visualised. Available from: http://crisisofcredit.com/
Kalecki, M., 1971, Selected essays on the dynamics of the capitalist economy 1933-1970. Cambridge University Press.
Kautsky, K., 1911. Finance – capital and crises. Available from: http://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1911/xx/finance.htm
Kregel, J., 2008. Minsky’s cushions of safety: Systemic risk and the crisis in the U.S. subprime mortgage market. The Public Policy Brief, Volume 93.Washinton DC.
Lucarelli, B., 2008. The United States Empire of debt: The roots of the financial crisis. Journal of Australian Political Economy, Edition 62, pp 16-38
Marx, K., 1885. Capital Volume II. Available from: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/Marx_Capital_Vol_2.pdf
Stiglitz, J., 2002. ‘Globalization and its Discontents, Chapter 4: The East Asia Crisis’. Allen lane, London
Comparison Asian and Sub-prime mortgage crises
Author: Tomas Freitas
Introduction
The first economic crisis broke out in the year 1815, followed by 1825, 1836, 1847, 1857, 1866, 1873, 1882, and 1891 and again in 1895. The alternation between prosperity and crisis had become a regular occurrence between 1873 and 1895. Another crisis occurred again in 1907 (Kautsky, 1911, 12). However, why were those crises so very extensive affecting the whole of society at regular periods? This short essay will not discuss the historical background of these various crises as has been discussed by Kautsky, but will examine two recent crises which occurred in East Asia in 1997 and in the United States just recently in 2008. This short essay will attempt to link the Sub-prime mortgage crises and Marx theories of economic crises.
After the Asian monetary crisis of the mid-1990s, the economic crisis has returned and is affecting the global economy, global financial markets, companies, banks, and jobs. Global stock markets have declined, big financial institutions have shrunk or been bought out, millions of workers have lost their jobs and governments in even the wealthiest countries have had to respond with economic stimulus packages. However, what are the causes of this crisis? And why the Marxist tendency questions the crises rather than the recovery? These questions challenge the main hypotheses of Marx economic theory in explaining economic crises. This essay will present a number of contradictory arguments around the proposition that Marxism can explain economic crises.
Do these phenomena correspond to Marxist theory of the failure of capitalism? How do these crises correlate with Marx’ criticism of capitalism? Can Marx prove his theories of economic crises? This essay will explore the relevance of these notions to reality in the 21st century.
Marx Theories of Economic Crises
There are three distinct theories of crises that Marx strongly believes in which are discussed in detail in Capital II and III. Those theories are the theory of ‘disproportionalities’, the theory of, ‘the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (TRPF)’ and the theory of ‘underconsumption’. To understand how those theories work, Marx has illustrated three components to analyse total value of goods and services produced in each industry in a capitalist economy. These components include ‘Constant capital (c)’ the value of all means of production in other words is as an instrument of labour such as capital goods, like buildings, machinery and labouring animals etc., and circulating constant capital, such as raw and auxiliary materials, semi-finished products, etc. ‘Variable capital (v), so far as its value is concerned, is equal to the value of the social labour-power employed; in other words, it consists of the labour-power in action, is the direct contribution of the workforce. The third item, ‘Surplus value(s) ’, is that part of the total value created that is used by the employer (Marx, 1885).
Frank Stilwell in his book Political Economy: The Contest of Economic Ideas (2002), has simplified some of Marx’ terminologies such as ‘disproportionalities’. This terminology officially refers to inequalities among the two sectors. It is the Marxist economic model to scrutinize the crucial circumstances for reproduction and growth of the economy, for instance dividing into two groups according to whether they produce capital goods (Department 1) or consumer goods (Department 2): Department 1: total value = c1 + v1 + s1 and Department 2: total value = c2 + v2 + s2 . Marx argued that the economy can reproduce itself if the two conditions met each other. The first condition is that the value of capital goods which has been used in the production process during any time period (c1 + c2) must be matched by new disbursements on capital goods (c1 + v1 + s1): (c1 + c2) = (c1 + v1 + s1). If this condition is met, the ability production of industry is sustained. The second condition is that total non-refundable incomes of the workers (v1 + v2) and the capitalists (s1 + s2) should be equal to the value of the output of consumer goods (c1 + v1 + s1): v1 + v2 + s1 + s2 = c2 + v2 + s2. If this condition is met, all the commodities made will be sold (Marx cited in Stilwell, 2002, 122).
To illustrate the second theory of TRPF, Marx has used three important ratios defined as follows: s/v is the rate of surplus value (sometimes called rate of exploitation), c/v is the organic composition of capital: s / (c + v) is the rate of profit. This rate of profit can be expressed in terms of the rate of surplus value and the organic composition of capital by dividing each term in the numerator and denominator by v, that is: s / v divide into c / v + 1 But why does this rate of profit tend to fall as capital accumulation takes place? Consider the effect of a rise in c / v, caused by businesses installing more plants and machinery in their production processes (Marx cited in Stilwell, 2002, 139).
Marx’ third theory of crises is ‘underconsumptionist’ or ‘Overproduction’; this theory is not entirely Marx, but in different categories of analysis development, John Maynard Keynes and Kalecki (1971) also explain the problem of inadequacies in effective demand. This theory explains that the periods in which capitalist production applies all its forces are always phases of overproduction, because the forces of production can never be utilised beyond the point at which surplus value can be not only produced but also realised.
Correlation between theories and evidence
Asian Crises
As mentioned in the introduction, this essay will only examine two current crises, namely the East Asian crisis of 1997 and 2008 crisis in the United States caused by the collapse of sub-prime mortgages.
First, the Asian economic crisis, and some preliminary methodological remarks on what it means to “cause” a crisis. How did the East Asian miracle unravel into a deep crisis? Some arguments state that an important change was the detection of swift financial liberalisation and capital accounts opening without the development of strength supervision and regulation. There were difficulties faced by East Asian policymakers in coping with the in-flows of capital that resulted from rapid capital market liberalisation. And the ability to undertake preventative macroeconomic policy was not present (Berg, 1999).
An IMF working paper states:
The crises had their origins in fundamental deficiencies in the affected countries. In Thailand, some role was played by traditional macroeconomic problems, particularly current account deficits that became unsustainably large and an exchange rate that had become overvalued. Generally, though, the weaknesses in the crisis countries derived from the interaction of weak domestic financial institutions with large capital inflows (Berg, 1999, 3).
To simplify the IMF statement above, Bill Lucarelli has stated that the causes of the economic crises in Thailand, Indonesia, The Philippines and Korea is due to speculator attacks on their respective currencies (Lucarelli, 2008).
If we analyse the IMF statement above, it shows a mutual connection between investments in ‘large capital inflows’ and the Marxist theory of ‘TRPF’. It makes sense because those Asian countries invested enormous amount of equities in foreign financial markets with deficits in local currencies, and with a lack of supervision and regulation (traditional Macroeconomic theory), which is then easily attacked by speculators. In Thailand, the government tried to support their own national currency by selling dollars from its reserves, and buying up the local currency to sustain its value. But eventually, the government ran out of hard currency, there were no more dollars to sell, the currency plunged and the speculators were satisfied (Stiglitz, 2002). The former of the head of World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, states that: “I believe that capital account liberalisation was the single most important factor leading to the crisis” (2002, 99). He pointed out that the capital account liberalisation represents risk without return. Stiglitz (2002) also analysed that there has been a trend in the last quarter century for investors to prefer huge outflows to inflows.
Marx theory of TRPF can be seen in relation to the Asian crisis in that bankers bought more equities in foreign currencies, while their management was still in a process of improvement. On the other hand, governments held strong their national currency, but at the same time created deficits. And ‘capital account liberalisation’ can accumulate profit, however this leads to major consequences in a downturn.
Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis
So what are the causes of this 2008 crisis? One common approach has been to lay the blame on the collapse of sub-prime mortgage markets in the United States, which is a credit crisis in US mortgages investment. This has happened because faced with a loss of equity capital, banks are unwilling to make ordinary business loans. Without credit, many businesses are facing bankruptcy and liquidation. This means a rising rate of joblessness, reduced individual expenses rating, and declining industry revenues (Cobb, 2009).
Bill Lucarelli has described the sub-prime mortgage crisis as simple to follow. The commercial banks failed in properly monitoring the risk and value of the credit borrowers, which were sold to the secondary market in the form of collateralised debt obligation (CDO) assets. This meant that the conventional function of banks in examining risk was handed over to the prevailing credit agencies. The main reason for the banks doing this was to sell CDOs in order to accumulate a payment or a commission. In other words, financial deregulation permitted banks to issue credits and sell these assets into the second level of the markets, which were then renewed and mixed into other classes of financial assets (Lucarelli, 2008).
A similar perspective has been visualised by Jonathan Jarvis (2009) about the sub-prime mortgage credit crisis, starting with diversification of the CDOs into three different rates of categories: AAA for safe investments where interest rates are lower; category BBB called good investments; and category CCC, high risk investment that comes with high interest rates. The banks created category CCC because they had run out of the mortgage market for safe investment. However, category CCC was the one used to sell to lower-income families in the United States. This lower income family is called ‘sub-prime’, where the banks sell the entire category CCC. The banks also added high risk for new owners of sub-prime mortgage; no down payment, no free money and must have proof of income or the banks will take back the money. Then however when the banks try to re-sell the mortgage, it cannot be done because the mortgage price has dropped (Jarvis, 2009). Lower prices increase the necessity to sell and reinforce the excess supply, making it even more difficult for the investor to fully repay his/her loan from asset sales (Kregel, 2008).
The credit crisis in sub-prime mortgage became popular as a topic for economists to analyse the crisis. Aside from Lucarelli and Jarvis, Michael Dooley and Michael Hutchison have both provided strong analyses of this current crisis. They describe the sub-prime mortgage credit crisis as a result of ‘emerging markets’ which have had large impacts on Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads in emerging markets, which efficiently transmitted the financial crisis in the U.S. to markets abroad (Dooley & Hutchison, 2009).
If we analyse the chronologies of the credit crisis in the sub-prime mortgage industry, it shares a common understanding with the Marx theory of ‘underconsumption’ or ‘overproduction’, where the banks and the investors in mortgages in the United States ‘run out the market’ and try to re-sell it through the CDOs, failing at this however and finally resulting in bankruptcy which affected the entire global economy. Oversupply (overproduction) of housing was exacerbated when interest rates were increased and hundreds of thousands of lower middle income borrowers could no longer afford their mortgage payments and the houses came back onto the market (Gupta, 2008). Another once-popular theory was that a chronic problem of “under-consumption” the inability of households to purchase enough goods and services to utilise the economy’s productive capacity had exacerbated the slump (Bernanke, cited in Foster & Magdoff, 2009).
Conclusion
It is still unclear as per explanations from political economists as to why the economic crises occur periodically through the decades without any recipe for cure. There are many definitions of economic crisis, even to the extent that some political economists consider the crisis as whole cycle beginning from recession to recovery, with some only questioning recession rather than recovery. The international financial institutions still blame the Asian economic crises on a lack of experience in supervision and regulation which is a traditionally macroeconomic viewpoint. The same reasons have been applied to the credit crisis in subprime mortgages in the United States, which is lack of supervision by the commercial banks in controlling the credit agencies. Marxist classical theories of disproportionality seem to be correlated in the earlier years but have not really been discussed in relation to the more recent crises. However, this essay has attempted to demonstrate that Marx’ theory of ‘TRPF’ and ‘underconsumption or overproduction’ seem to have more of a place for debate as one of the unpredictable reasons relevant to contemporary economic crises.
References
Bellamy, F., & Magdoff, F., 2009. ‘Financial implosion and stagnation: Back to the real economy’. The Monthly Review. Available from: http://tomweston.net/FinStag.pdf
Berg, A., 1999. The Asia crisis: causes, policy responses, and outcomes. Social Science Research Network. Available from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=880665
Cobb, C., 2009. Editor’s Introduction. The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 68, No 4
Dooley, M & Hutchison, M., 2009. Transmission of the U.S. subprime crisis to emerging markets: Evidence on the decoupling–recoupling hypothesis. Journal of International Money and Finance. Volume 28, Issue 8, pp 1331-1349
Gupta, A., 2008. ‘How to Wreck the Economy’. The Independent. Available from: http://www.indypendent.org/2008/10/02/how-to-wreck-the-economy/
Jarvis, J., 2009. The crisis of credit visualised. Available from: http://crisisofcredit.com/
Kalecki, M., 1971, Selected essays on the dynamics of the capitalist economy 1933-1970. Cambridge University Press.
Kautsky, K., 1911. Finance – capital and crises. Available from: http://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1911/xx/finance.htm
Kregel, J., 2008. Minsky’s cushions of safety: Systemic risk and the crisis in the U.S. subprime mortgage market. The Public Policy Brief, Volume 93.Washinton DC.
Lucarelli, B., 2008. The United States Empire of debt: The roots of the financial crisis. Journal of Australian Political Economy, Edition 62, pp 16-38
Marx, K., 1885. Capital Volume II. Available from: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/Marx_Capital_Vol_2.pdf
Stiglitz, J., 2002. ‘Globalization and its Discontents, Chapter 4: The East Asia Crisis’. Allen lane, London
