Saida lolos mak akontese iha Yemen neba?
Tradusaun husi kompilasaun artiklus sira mak iha internet
Tradutor; Tomas Freitas
Krizi iha Yemen komesa iha tinan 2011-2012 wainhira revolusaun kontra Presidente Ali Abdulah Saleh, nebe ukun Yemen durante dekada tolu resin, (Hendawi, 2014). Depois Saleh resigna an iha inisiu 2012 hanesan parte husi agrementu mediasaun entre governu Yemen ho grupo opozisaun sira, governu temporariumente lidera husi Presidente Saleh nian Vice-Presidente, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, maibe governu refere susar atu hakoak fraksaun politika iha nasaun laran, ne’ebe ameasadu husi Al-Qaeda iha Peninsula Arabian nian no mos hetan presaun husi Militante Houthi nian ne’ebe kunyesidu hanesan grupo rebeldes mak sempre konfrontativu ho militar Yemen iha Norte Yemen iha tinan 2004-2015, (Al Arabiya, 2015). Iha 2014, Guerileiros Houthi domina capital sidade Sana’a no obriga Vice-Presidente Hadi hodi negosia “governu unidade” hamutuk ho fraksaun politika sira seluk. Grupo rebeldes kontinua halo presaun ba governu mak fraku ate Hadi nian palacio presidente no mos residensia privado hetan atake husi grupo militant, depois de atakasaun Hadi mos halo resignasaun hamutuk ho ninian gabinete ministros sira iha fulan Janeiro 2015. Hafoin tiha resignasaun liu fulan ida nian laran, grupo rebeldes Houthis deklara katak sira mak agora kontrola governu, grupo ne mos dissolve tiha Parlamentu no mos instala Komite Revolusionariu Interino ne’ebe lidera husi Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, primo husi Houthi nian lider Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, (Middle East Eye., 2015). Iha momentu neba mos eis Vice-Presidente Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi konsege halai sai ba sidade Aden, ne’ebe Nia deklara nudar baze lejitimidade ba Presidente Yemen nian, Hadi mos proklama sidade Aden nudar capital temporariu Yemen nian, Nia mos bolu ninian apoyante sira inklui membro governu official no mos forsa militar balun hodi ba hamutuk ho Nia iha sidade Aden, (Simeon, 2015). Iha loron 27 Marsu 2015, BBC halo reportazem katak forsa rebeldes konsege ataka no okupa sidade Aden, no Hadi konsege salva an halai ba Riyadh capital nasaun vizinho Saudi Arabiah, la kleur husi ida ne, Governu Saudi Arabia mos atake kedas Yemen ho sira nian forsa Aero, (BBC, 2015). Resutadu husi atake ida ne hamosu kedas guera civil entre governu Hadi nian no rebeldes Houthi sira. Desde 2017 grupo separatista seluk mak hanesan al-hirak al-Janoubi ne’ebe kunyesidu ho naran grupo Konsellu Tranzisaun Sul nian (Southern Transitional Council) mos kontinua kontra Governu Hadi nian.
Photo Kredit: Salah David
Klima protestu ne’ebe kunyesidu ho naran ‘The Arab Spring’ la persija tempo naruk atu to’o iha Yemen depois de revolusaun iha Tunisia. Molok ida ne Yemen nudar nasaun ida ne’ebe kiak aumenta tan ninian governasaun mak kunyesidu koruptu, inklui arma kilat barak ne’ebe espalha iha civil nian liman. Iha tinan 2011, nasaun ne enfrenta tiha ona konfrontasaun husi grupo Al-Qaeda ne’ebe ligasaun ho grupo separatista iha parte Sul, alende ne mos konfronta ho grupo rebeldes Zaydi Shia iha parte Norte nian. Historikamente nudar nasaun Yemen foin mak unidos iha tinan 1990, depois de diferensias entre Norte ho Sul.
Politika instabilidade iha Yemen akontese tanba mos razaun balun husi krizi ekolojia iha nasaun refere. Mayoria (Rata-rata) (average) sidadaun Yemen so hetan aksesu ba 140 m3/tinan (metro kuadradu kubik) bee mos kada tinan, kompara ho nasaun seluk iha Mediu Oriente 1000 m3/tinan, standard internasional 1700 m3/tinan, (Climate Change, 2001). Fontes bee mos ba nasaun ne mai husi perfurasaun bee rai okos, maibe ninian kuantidade bee rai okos tun bebeik kada tinan, hanesan ijemplo iha sidade Sana’a, perfurasaun bee rai-okos iha tinan 1970 bele to’o metro 30 hetan tiha ona bee mos, maibe iha tinan 2012 perfurasaun bee rai-okos persija to’o metro 1200 mak foin hetan bee, (Krista, 2010). Problema ne akontese tanba governu la regulariza utilizasaun bee rai-okos, no ida ne akontese molok krizi politika iha tinan 2011. Iha peritus barak mak halo tiha prediksaun katak Yemen sei sai nasaun primeiro mak bee mos laiha tanba ema hotu halo prefurasaun ba bee rai-okos. Agrikultor sira utiliza 90% bee rai-okos mesmo que kontribui deit 6% ba kresimentu ekonomia rai-laran. Kontrariomente ho ida ne, porsaun bot liu ema Yemen sira depende liu ba agrikultura kiik ou agrikultura skala subsistensia. Metade husi fornesementu bee mos ba agrikultura mak utiliza hodi rega “Khat” species aitahan ida hodi mama, atu hanesan (bua mak ferik ho katuas sira gosta mama), peritu sira dehan katak “Khat” ne hanesan narkotika ida ba ema Yemen sira hodi nata (chew). Ne signifika mesmo que Yemen nasaun ida mak menus bee, metade husi populasaun laiha aksesu ba ai-han, bee mak mai husi rai-okos so para uza hodi rega 45% agrikultor mak kuda ‘”Khat” ne’ebe la’os hahan.
Seguranca bee mos iha ninian impaktu direita ba iha estabilidade politika Yemen nian. Ema iha liur rona liu kona ba “Proxy War” funu entre faksaun ne’ebe balun hetan suporta husi nasaun seluk, maibe bazeia ba Jornal diario Yemen nian Al-Thawra, katak 70% - 80% konflito iha nasaun ne relasiona ho kestaun bee mos. Ministro interior Yemen nian deklara katak kazu hadaun malun bee mos ho rai resulta ona ema nain rihun hat (4,000) mak mate kada tinan, numero ne bot liu fali numero terorista sira nian, (Heffez, 2013). Iha rejiaun ida naran Al-Jawf Governorate, nebe sai hanesan baze grupo separatista Militant Shi’a Islamist, disputa oho malun tanba bee mos akontese besik tinan tolu nulu ona seidauk resolve, (IRIN., 2012). Iha tinan 2007, Ministro Bee no Rekurso Naturais sujere ba populasaun mak hela iha sidade Sana’a atu hodi evakua tanba bee mos laiha, (Kirby, 2007). Mesmo que governu fo orientasaun tiha ona ba evakuasaun, maibe molok ne sidade refere rahun tiha ona tanba sidade ne sai fatin ba terenu batalha, e ema ida idak sente la seguru no evakua an rasik ba fatin seluk. Alende, katastropi enviromentu nian estraga tiha ona tiha ona Yemen, iha tinan 2015, Yemen mos hetan destroy husi iha anin fuik cyclone rua ; primeiro mak Cyclone Chapala, segundu mak Cyclone Megh ne’ebe estraga plantasaun ai-han agrikultor sira nian, (Oakford, 2015).
Moras Cholera komesa hadaet ema durante Guerra civil akontese iha Yemen. Iha Julho 2017, Kordenador Nasoens Unidas ne’ebe toma konta kestaun humanitaria relata katak iha tinan 2017 kazu Cholera atinzi ona liu 320,000 kazu, (Falk, 2017). UNO mos fo sala Guerra civil, ne’ebe mak akontese no grupo combatente balun hetan suporta husi forsa internasional balun, wainhira tama iha fulan Outubro 2017, numero ema no labarik mak kona moras Cholera atinzi liu kazu rihun atus walu resin 800,000 (Lyons, 2017).
Tradusaun husi artiklu mak iha leten ne mesmo ladun detalho maibe konsege ilustra saida mak akontese lolos iha Yemen neba. Guerra Civil nebe akontese entre grupo mak pro Governu no mos grupo separatista sira oho malun tanba deit hadau malun atu kaer poder, no grupo balun hetan apoiu husi forsa internasional. Alende Guerra Civil, kestaun hadauk malun bee mos sai tiha ona problema bot molok grupo armada sira oho malun. Artiklu ne mos eskreve, wainhira governu ida mak la regula ho diak perfurasaun bee rai okos no husik deit sidadaun ida-idak livre hodi fura ninian bee mos, Konsekuensiamente bee rai okos ninian kuantidade sai menus liu tanba hahalok sira ne. Tanba husi hadauk malun bee mos, ikus mai resulta populasaun barak mak hetan moras epidemic Cholera tanba deit bee mak sira konsumu kontaminadu tiha ona ho foer.
Al Arabiya., 2015, ‘Al-Qaeda thrieves in Yemen amid weak security, stalled dialogue’, retrieved 6 Feb 2015.
BBC., 2015, ‘President Hadi Leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue’, retrieved 27 May 2015.
Falk, P., 2017, ‘ U.N. Warned “We should all feel deeply guilty” as Yemenies dies’, CBS News. Retreived 13 July 2017.
Heffez, A., 2013, ‘ How Yemen Chewed Itself Dry’, Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 17 April 2015.
Hendawi, H., 2014, ‘Yemen’s crisis reflects arc of Arab Springs revolts’, retrieved 8 Feb 2015.
IRIN., 2012, ‘ Yemen: Time running out for solution to water crisis’, Retrieved 13 August 2012.
Kirby, A., 2007, ‘Yemen’s Khat habit soaks up water’, BBC News, 7 of April 2007.
Krista, M., 2010, ‘ What if Yemen is the first Country to Run Out of Water’, Time Magazine. Retrieved 17 April 2015.
Lyons, K., 2017, ‘ Yemen’s Cholera outbreak now the worst in history as millionth case looms’, The Guardian, retrieved 3 March 2018.
Middle East Eye., 2015, ‘Houthi militia installs ‘presidential council’ to run Yemen’, Retrieved 6 Feb 2015.
Oakford, S., 2015, ‘ Battered By Civil War and Historic Cyclones, Yemen Now Faces Swarms of Locusts’, Vice News, Retrieved 12 Dec 2015.
Simeon, K., 2015, ‘ UN and Gulf back Yemeni president Hadi amid fears of civil war’, Financial Times, Retrived 22 March 2015.
Oinsa Fundo Petrolifero Sustenta Orsamento Jeral Estado
Wainhira Minarai Maran?
Autor: Tomas Freitas
Nasaun barak iha mundo esforsu hakore - an husi dependensia ba seitor petroleu tanba la sustentavel, rezerva menus no folin la estavel mak sai hanesan sasukat. Iha fulan Junho 2014 folin minarai atinzi $115 kada bidon, no iha Febreiru 2016 tun ba $35 kada barril, (Rogoff, 2016). Haktuir relatoriu husi World Economic Forum hateten katak razaun ba folin minarai tun la’os deit tanba nasaun OPEC sira hamenus sira nian produsaun (Supply Failure) hanesan akontese iha tinan 1985-1986. Petroleu nian folin tun mos la’os deit tanba krizi ekonomiku hanesan akontese iha tinan 2008-2009 ne’ebe kunyesidu ho (Demand Failure), maibe iha relatoriu ne deskreve folin tun tanba buat rua ne hotu, liu liu relasiona ho nasaun China nian kresimentu ekonomia, ne’ebe afeita makás husi sasan folin tun (Sharps drops in commodity price). Deklarasaun ne hato’o husi Profesor Dr. Kenneth Rogoff husi Universidade Harvard, (Rogoff, 2016).
Iha artiklu ne, sei la deskuti kona ba tanba sa mina nian folin tun, autor sei tenta haré Timor-Leste nian dependensia ba industria extraktivu, no analiza oinsa Fundo Petrolifero bele sustenta Orsamento Jeral do Estado.
Iha paper ne autor koko analiza data balun relasiona ho industria extraktivu husi Tasi Timor, liu-liu produsaun mai husi rezevoar sira hanesan Elang Kakatua ho Kakatua Norte (EKKN), Bayu Undan no KITAN. Analiza ne atu loke fila fali ho klean data official mak publika husi Autoridade Nasional do Petroleum e Minerais (ANPM), no data balun publika iha dokumentu Orsamentu Jeral do Estado. Resultadu investigasaun ne detekta bainhira los mak produsaun husi Kampo Bayu Undan sei maran, tanba sekuandu Timor-Leste la halo ona produsaun, entaun sei afekta kalae ba iha kalkulasaun Rendimentu Estimativu Sustentavel (RSE), signifika mos futuru nasaun Timor-Leste atu sai oinsa los.
Photo credit to Roberth Garvey
Iha tabela kraik, autor konsege kompila hamutuk evidensia mak mai husi relatoriu annual Timor Sea Designate Authority (TSDA), relatoriu annual Autoridade Nasional do Petroleum e Minerais (ANPM) no mos informasaun balun preve iha dokumentu livro do Orsamentu Jeral do Estado. Mai haré didiak informasaun hirak ne.
Fontes: Annual Report TSDA, Annual report ANPM, Livros Orsamento Geral do Estado.
Koluna dahuluk husi tabela iha leten representa informasaun kona ba produsaun mina-matak husi posu Bayu Undan, koluna tuir deskreve dadus kona ba produsaun gas mai husi Bayu Undan, koluna seluk eskrita informasaun balun mesmo la kumpletu kona ba produsaun mina-matak husi KITAN, iha koluna nia sorin seluk iha informasaun oituan kona ba produsaun gas husi KITAN. Alende informasaun kona ba likuido ho gas husi rezevoar rua Bayu Undan ho KITAN, iha mos koluna seluk fo sai numero total produsaun minarai kompostu husi Elang Kakatua ho Kakatua Norte (EKKN) + Bayu Undan + KITAN, data produsaun hirak ne fo sai desde tinan 2004 ate 2017. Iha tabela mos hatudu kona ba folin presu minarai kada barril ne’ebe mina-matak nian folin adere ba. Informasaun husi koluna ikus liu ilustra rendimentu receitas husi aktividades petrolifero, kompostu husi mina ho gas nian folin no mos taxa hirak mak kolekta husi aktividades refere.
Relatoriu annual Authoridade Nasional do Petroleo e Minerais (ANPM) 2017, esklarese produsaun mina matak (liquidos) kada loron husi Kampo Bayu Undan. Bazeia ba publikasaun website ANPM (2017) nian liu husi (Lafaek, Field Production Data), total produsaun mina husi Bayu Undan iha tinan 2017 hamutuk barril Miliaun 41,417,962.91 sekuandu ita kompara ho total produsaun iha tinan 2016, ne’ebe produs barril miliaun 48,868,023.30 numeros mak diferensia provolta barril miliaun 7,397,060.39 ho liafuan seluk ita bele hateten produsaun iha tinan 2017 tun liu 15% kompara ho produsaun 2016 nian, (ANPM, 2017). Wainhira halo analiza produsaun kada loron husi tinan 2004 – 2017, data publika katak produsaun kada loron menus husi tinan ba tinan. Data produsaun kada loron iha tinan 2004 komesa ho kuantidade 115.000 barril maibe wainhira kontinua halo produsaun lor-loron durante tinan sanulu resin hat nian laran agora menus liu 25.000 barril, (ANPM, 2017,25). Iha faktus mos hatudu wainhira rezerva likuidos tun dadaun produsaun kada loron mos resulta diferensia bot, ijemplo iha tinan 2016 diferensia 15.3% kompara ho tinan 2015 nian, nune mos produsaun iha tinan 2017 menus 20.6% kompara ho tinan 2016 nian.
Iha parte seluk tabela iha leten mos performa produsaun gas kada loron husi kampo Bayu Undan ne’ebe hatudu data diferente oituan ho produsaun minarai nian. Hahu’u husi tinan 2008 produsaun gas kada loron kuaze estabil durante dekada ida nian laran, data iha leten deskreve iha tinan 2008 produsaun gas kada loron atinzi 500 Milion Meter Square Cubic Feet (Mmscf), (ANPM, 2008, 20), numero produsaun ne konsege hakmatek durante tinan tolu nian laran, depois iha tinan 2011 numero konsege sae ba 550 ate 588 Mmscf iha tinan 2015, (ANPM, 2011, 26 & 2015, 22) hafoin tun fali ba 510 Mmscf iha tinan 2017, (ANPM, 2017, 25).
Alende produsaun husi Posu Bayu Undan, Timor-Leste mos iha posu seluk hanesan KITAN. Mina-matan refere komesa ninian produsaun mina matak ba dahuluk iha loron 11 de Outubro 2011 no produsaun aktividades ne taka iha loron 15 Dezembro 2015, (ANPM, 2015). Rezevoar KITAN hapara sira nian aktividade produsaun tanba likuido menus liu, data iha tabela hateten produsaun minarai ikus liu husi KITAN kada loron provolta deit 5000 – 6000 barril, (ANPM, 2016, 24). Mesmo durasaun tempo ba produsaun ladun naruk maibe rezevoar refere konsege hatama osan milioens ba konta (Account) Fundo Petrolifero.
Informasaun iha tabela leten mos ilustra total produsaun kada tinan nian, kompostu husi Elang Kakatua ho Kakatua Norte (EKKN), aumenta tan Bayu Undan ho KITAN. Numerous rezerva indika momos kuantidade produsaun hahu’u husi tinan 2004 produs ona likuidos provolta barril miliaun rua nulu resin ate miliaun nen nulu resin, total kuantidade produsaun kontribui husi EKKN ho Bayu Undan iha tinan 2004 – 2007. Hafoin EKKN la halo tan ninian produsaun iha tinan 2007, Bayu Undan mesak halo produsaun konsege supa sai mina matak ho kuantidade barril miliaun nen nulu resin tolu ate miliaun hitu nulu resin hat iha tinan 2008-2010. Iha 2011 rezevoar KITAN mos hahu’u halo produsaun no entre posu rua konsege produs hamutuk mina-matak bidon miliaun nen nulu resin walu iha tinan 2011, no bidon miliaun lima nulu resin rua liu iha tinan 2015 molok KITAN hakotu ninian destinu. Agora dadaun uniku rezevoar halo produsaun mak Bayu Undan ne’ebe iha tinan 2016 produs ona mina-matak bidon miliaun hat nulu resin walu, no produs mina-matak bidon miliaun hat nulu resin ida iha tinan 2017, (ANPM, 2017).
Koluna ikus iha tabela leten hato’o total receitas petroleum ne’ebe kompostu husi faan minarai nian folin no taxa ne’ebe kolekta husi aktividades petroliferos. Informasaun deskreve iha koluna esklarese receitas aumenta wainhira kuantidade produsaun aumenta barak no presu mundial mos ninian folin aumenta as. Observasaun ba data mak publika iha livros Orsamento Jeral do Estado durante tinan tolu nian laran wainhira produsaun sei barak no mina nian folin kada bidon faan ho folin $88 iha tinan 2011 (Ministerio das Financas, 2012, 29), faan ho presu $91 iha tinan 2012 (Ministerio das Financas, 2013, 61), no $86.6 iha tinan 2013, (Ministerio das Financas, 2014, 42). Durante period tinan tolu receitas husi Tasi Timor konsege hatama osan biliaun sia resin ba konta Fundo Petrolifero. Maibe agora Receitas total husi Tasi Timor tun barak tanba kuantidade rezerva menus, informasaun husi tinan 2016 nian deklara osan tama miliaun $223.9 (Ministerio das Financas, 2018, 52). Numero refere tun kuaze 77.1% kompara ho receitas tinan 2015 mak hamutuk miliaun 978.9 razaun fundamentu husi receitas tun tanba mina folin tun iha merkadu global no mina bidon ida faan deit ho folin $42.7, (Ministerio das Financas, 2017, 52).
Informasaun iha tabela leten hatudu provas katak aktividades produsaun husi Bayu Undan sei para iha loron ida, ijemplo ne hatudu ona husi EKKN no mos KITAN. Mina-matan KITAN hapara sira nian produsaun wainhira sira produs deit bidon rihun lima (5000) kada loron, (ANPM, 2016, 24). Tanba Kompania operador hatene ona kustu ba halo produsaun bot liu fali kompara ho lukru mak sira hetan husi faan mina refere. Molok halo prediksaun bainhira mak Bayu Undan atu hapara ninian produsaun tuir mai bele analiza didiak grafiku balun mak iha kraik ne’ebe publika husi Autoridade Nasional Petroleum e Minerais nian relatoriu annual iha tinan 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.
Grafik Produsaun Mina no Gas iha Rezevoar Bayu Undan husi Janeiru-Dezembru 2014
Fontes Imajen husi Relatoriu Annual ANPM 2014, pajina 21
Iha grafiku leten ilustra produsaun mina matak mak produs typu tolu husi likuidos ne rasik, typu tolu mak inklui; Propane ho linha kor café, Buthane ho linha kor azul, no Condensate ho kor matak, typu tolu ne tau hamutuk mak hanaran total likuido iha linha kor metan. Total likuido mak produs iha fulan Janeiro 2014 provolta bidon rihun lima nulu (50,000) kada loron, no iha fulan dezembro 2014 tun ba bidon rihun hat nulu (40,000) kada loron. Informasaun iha grafiku komfirmadu ho informasaun mak publika iha tabela iha leten, ne’ebe deskreve produsaun kada loron iha tinan 2014 provolta (average) rihun hat nulu, virgula atus hitu resin (40,700), (ANPM, 2014, 21).
Grafik Produsaun Mina ho Gas Kampo Bayu Undan husi Janeiru – Dezembru 2015
Fontes imajen husi Relatoriu Annual APNM 2015, Pajina 22
Bazia ba grafiku iha leten, linha kor azul performa total produsaun likuido iha loron ida nian ba fulan janeiro 2015 hamutuk bidon rihun hat nulu (40,000) no iha fulan dezembru produsaun provolta bidon rihun tolu nulu (30,000). Data hirak ne mos hanesan ho Informasaun mak iha tabela leten ne’ebe indika produsaun kada loron durante tinan 2015 nian provolta bidon rihun tolu nulu resin hitu virgule atus walu (37,800), (ANPM, 2015, 22).
Grafik Produsaun Mina ho Gas Posu Bayu Undan husi Janeiru – Dezembru 2017
Fontes Imajen husi relatoriu annual ANPM 2017, pajina 29.
Autor la konsege hetan grafiku tinan 2016 nian tanba iha ANPM nian relatoriu annual 2016 nafatin publika grafiku mak hanesan ba tinan 2015 nian.
Grafiku iha leten hakerek produsaun kada loron husi kampo Bayu Undan nian komesa husi Janeiru ate Dezembro 2017. Iha linha kor Azul aponta produsaun nian kuantidade tun husi rihun tolu nulu (30,000) ba to’o iha rihun rua nulu (20,000). Justifikasaun iha tabela leten hatudu katak minarai Bayu Undan kada loron iha tinan 2017 halo produsaun provolta rihun rua nulu resin lima virgula atus hat resin hat nulu (25,440), (ANPM, 2017, 25).
Wainhira analiza grafiku tolu iha leten klaru iha indikasaun produsaun likuidos kada loron nian iha tinan-tinan tun kuaze rihun sanulu resin (10,000). Referensia mak deskreve tiha ona fo prediksaun iha tinan 2018 produsaun kada loron sei tun husi rihun rua nulu (20,000) ba rihun sanulu (10,000), no iha tinan 2019 produsaun sei kontinua tun husi rihun sanulu (10,000) ba Zero produsaun, entaun bele dehan katak entre fulan Junho to Julho Bayu Undan sei atinzi produsaun 5,000 barril kada loron, ne signifika Bayu Undan nian destinu mos to’o ona. Tanba KITAN nian destinu mos hakotu ho produsaun entre 5,000 – 6,000 barril kada loron. Numeros iha tabela leten hatudu wainhira KITAN komesa ninian produsaun iha tinan 2011, mina-matan refere hahu’u ho kuantidade produsaun kada loron rihun hat nulu resin (40,030) no remata iha tinan 2015, KITAN nian durasaun tinan lima deit wainhira kuantidade produsaun hahu’u ho rihun hat nulu (40,030) kada loron, (ANPM, 2011, 33). Iha parte hanesan Bayu Undan mos atinzi sira nian produsaun kada loron rihun hat nulu, resin atus hitu (40,700) iha tinan 2014 (ANPM, 2014, 21), signifika mos iha tinan lima nian laran (2019) aktividades produsaun iha area refere tama ona ba faze desmantelementu.
Transferensia Fundo Petrolifero
Sekuandu produsaun husi Bayu Undan hotu ona, saida mak akontese transferensia Fundo Petrolifero? Bazeia ba Lei Fundo Petrolifero nian iha artigu numero 8 kona ba Transferensia ne’ebe hakerek hanesan tuir mai;
Rekerementu ba Tranferensia
Laiha transferensia ida mak bele halo husi Fundo Petrolifero iha tinan fiscal nian laran, wainhira Governu seidauk hato’o ba Parlemento Nasional relatorio hirak mak hanesan;
(a) Espesifiku kona ba Rendimentu Sustentavel Estimativo ba tinan fiscal ne’ebe transfere ne atu halo;
(b) Espesifiku kona ba Rendimentu Sustentavel Estimativo husi tinan fiscal ne’ebe liu ba; no
(c) Sertifikadu husi Auditor Independente kona ba Rendimentu Sustentavel Estimativo ne’ebe refere ba paragraph (a) ho (b) mak iha leten.
Fontes: Lei Fundo Petrolifero No 9/2005, Pajina 5.
Artigu 8 klaramente hakerek uniku transferensia husi Fundo Petrolifero ba Orsamento Jeral do estado mak liu husi kalkulasaun Rendimentu Sustentavel Estimativo (RSE), hanesan deskreve iha paragraf a), b), ho c) mak temi tiha ona. Tuir mai akompaña hamutuk oinsa halo kalkulasaun ba RSE, haktuir peritu husi Fundo Monetario Internasional, Alistar Watson ne’ebe hato’o apresentasaun ba grupo Sociadade Civil Timor-Leste nian iha tinan 2010.
Fontes Lao Hamutuk website, (Watson, 2010).
Tabela iha leten hato’o ijemplo iha tinan sanulu nian laran, sekuandu receitas husi Tasi Timor hatama deit miliaun atus lima (500) entaun tinan-tinan receitas so fornese deit atus ida (100) durante tinan lima dahuluk. Tabela iha leten hato’o ijemplo retornu investementu aumenta 3% tinan-tinan, no numerous iha tabele leten mos halo kalkulasaun bazeia ba 3% Rendimentu Sustentavel Estimativo. Financial Assets signifika total investementu mak iha Fundo Petrolifero (FP), iha tabela ne ilustra katak iha tinan primeiro; assets iha FP seidauk iha (0), receitas husi Tasi laran hetan deit miliaun $100, no transferensia ba OJE miliaun $14, entaun balansu iha konta Fundo Petrolifero hela deit miliaun $86. Retornu investimentu 3% iha tinan primeiro husi miliaun $100 nian mak miliaun $3. Iha tinan segundu; receitas tama mak; (100 + 100 - 14 = 186 x 3% = 5), iha tabela mos fosai wainhira receitas latama tanba produsaun la lao ona, ho retornu investementu 3%, no sekarik Parlamentu Nasional disiplina aprova Fundo Petrolifero bazeia ba 3 % RSE nian, e halo transferensia ba OJE laliu miliaun $14 tinan-tinan, entaun analiza husi Alistair Watson nian sei la falha, signifika minarai maran mos Fundo Petrolifero Sei bele kontinua sustenta Orsamento Jeral do Estado iha futuru.
Iha realidade estadu Timor-Leste dala barak kontinua halo transferensia Fundo Petrolifero liu tiha kalkulasaun 3 % husi Rendimentu Sustentavel Estimativo. Tuir mai tabela kraik sei hatudu durante ne osan hira ona mak estadu foti husi Fundo Petrolifero.
Fontes; Livros do Orsamento Jeral do Estado & Relatorios Annual Fundo Petrolifero
Tabela iha leten, deskreve informasaun detailho komesa husi tinan 2005 – 2018 , informasaun hirak ne mak inklui numero total Fundo Petrolifero nian, Gastu ba Orsamento Jeral do Estado, no receitas husi Fundo Petrolifero ba Orsamento Jeral do Estado, inklui mos informasaun sobre receitas domestica. Iha koluna dahuluk ilustra balansu total husi Fundo Petrolifero iha tinan 2005 wainhira halo investementu ba dahuluk komesa ho osan miliaun $204.6, (Ministerio das Financas, 2007, 4), no balansu ikus iha tinan 2018 nian mak Biliaun $16.927,3 (Ministerio das Financas, 2018, 52).
Iha koluna segundu apresenta kona ba retornu investementu husi Fundo Petrolifero, no kuaze tinan tinan sempre iha retornu positivo maibe mos iha tinan balun indika retornu negative ijemplo mak iha tinan fiscal 2005-06 retornu investementu lakon osan miliaun lima virgula atus walu tolu nulu resin ida ($5,831) (Ministerio das Financas, 2007, 5) no iha tinan 2015 lakon osan miliaun rua nulu resin ida virgule zero nen nulu ($21,060), (Ministerio das Financas, 2015, 25) .
Bazeia ba Lei Fundo Petrolifero No 12/2012, artigu 15 kona ba Regras de Investementu, paragraph 1) deside Fundo Petrolifero halo investementu konservativu la menus liu 50 % iha US Treasury Bonds. Iha parte seluk, paragraph 2) hateten bele halo investementu la liu 50% iha Dezenvolvementu Merkadu Financeiru (Equities), (Ministerio das Financas, 2011). Banco Central Timor-Leste responsabliza ba 41% husi investementu total husi fundu, no 59% husi Fundo jere husi jestor privado sira seluk hanesan; Bank for International Settlements (10%), Alliance Bernstein (5%), Wellinton (5%), State Street Global Advisors (17), Black Rock (17%), no Schroders (5%), (Ministerio das Financas, 2017,2).
Koluna tuir fali relata informasaun detalho kona ba total transfarensia tinan-tinan husi Fundo Petrolifero ba Orsamento Jeral do Estado. Alende koluna seluk hakerek informasaun kona ba numeros osan mak transfere bazeia ba 3% Rendimentu Sustentavel Estimativo. Iha koluna seluk fali fosai numeros osan mak foti liu husi platform 3% RSE nian, iha koluna ne mos, iha tinan balun transferensia husi Fundo Petrolifero la liu RSE, ijemplo mak iha tinan fiscal 2006-07, 2007, 2013, ho razaun tanba kalkulasaun RSE bot liu fali transferensia ne’ebe persija.
Informasaun balun iha tabela leten hakerek kona ba total gastus Orsamentu Jeral do Estadu kada tinan hahu’u husi tinan fiscal 2005-06 ate 2018, informasaun seluk iha koluna tuir fali kona ba prosentazem husi alokasaun Fundo Petrolifero ba iha OJE provolta entre 80 -90%. Koluna ikus husi tabela iha leten mos indika receitas domestica seidauk bele atinzi 20% husi total Orsamento Jeral do Estado. Mesmo Iha VI governu konstitusional kria tiha ona ekipa ida ho naran Komisaun Reforma Fiskal, maibe implementasaun husi politika ne foin mak implementa, ninian ijemplo mak hanesan sistema pagamentu elektronika TPA/POS (Point of Sale Terminal) ne’ebe implementa tiha ona iha Alfandega iha loron 30 de Julho 2018, (Ministerio das Financas, 2018).
Data ho informasaun sira mak hato’o tiha ona iha artiklu ne fo hanoin ba ita Produsaun husi Kampo Bayu Undan iha posibilidade bot atu maran iha tinan 2019. Sekuandu laiha tan ona receitas husi industria extraktivu, Fundo Petrolifero sei depende deit ba iha retornu investementu fundo ne rasik. Wainhira Estadu Timor-Leste kontinua foti osan husi Fundo ne liu 3% RSE nian ho montante Biliaun 1.5 entaun signifika ezistensia Fundo nian sei la to’o 2028. Maibe sekuandu Orsamentu Jeral do Estadu sei atu gasta provolta biliaun 1.2 entaun fundo refere sei bele auguenta to’o tinan 2032. Mas kuandu governu atu foti biliaun 5-6 tan para halo investementu seluk, entaun durasaun husi fundo sei menus liu tan husi tinan sanulu nian laran. Evidensia mak iha artiklu hatudu numeros receitas domestica seidauk aumenta maksimal, espera katak ho mekanismo foun kona ba pagamentu elektroniku bele hasae rendimentu receitas domestica ba iha kofre do estado.
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Can a Minskyian Perspective explain the Financial Crisis 2008?
Author Tomas Freitas
Since 1957, Minsky has argued that a high capitalist economy with developed financial institutions is basically unbalanced, and will plunge into a depression as a consequence of a period of debt-financed “euphoria”. Minsky’s strictures were abandoned throughout the long boom of the 1960s, and even during the oil and Third World debt shocks of the 1970s (Keen, 1995). However, his theories cannot be disregarded after a long period of economic instability which began with the collapse of securitization of home mortgages in 1987 (Minsky, 2008). The collapse of the sub-prime market in August 2008 has been widely tagged a “Minsky moment,” (Palley, 2009). This current crisis has invited many economists to interpret what is really going on and why these kinds of crisis are repeated. Apart from Marxist theories of economic crisis, there are a number of political economists attempting to follow and draw a picture of the roots of the crisis - one of them is Hyman Minsky.
This essay will attempt to explain how the current financial crisis relates to a traditional Minsky hypothesis. Minsky’s theory of financial instability hypothesis comes from John Maynard Keynes general theory (2008), which is argued by Adam Smith in his views of market processes in his book “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations: Book IV, Chapter 2,” (1776).
These contradictory arguments have inspired Minsky to elaborate his financial instability hypothesis. To generate his hypothesis, Minsky uses several approaches including debt deflation by Irving Fisher, the credit view of money by Joseph Schumpeter which is in favour of Institutional Structural, Minsky’s own Cushions of Safety which were reviewed by Jan Kregel, as well as Minsky’s non-financial firms such as hedge fund, speculative and ponzi units. The financial instability hypothesis also is incorporated with the view of profits, which is developed by Kalecki (1991) and Levy (1983).
However, this essay will be limited to discussing two different views of Keynes and Smith which are fundamental to Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis and which have re-generated into two basics theories of “debt-deflations” and “cushions of safety” with the help of two importance variables including “Ponzi Pyramids” and “Institutional Structures”. Before moving into those discussions, the essay will provide a short biography of Minsky.
A biography of Minsky
Hyman Philip Minsky was born on 23 September 1919, completed his bachelor degree in Mathematics at Chicago University in 1941, and achieved his MPA in 1947 and PhD in 1954 at Harvard University. Two Chicago professors were the most significant early influences on his thought (Minsky, 1985). The inspiration to study economics came from Oskar Lange, who was at that time working out a synthesis of Marx and neoclassical economics that he called market socialism (Lange, 1938). Henry Simons was the source of Minsky’s lifelong interest in finance, as well as the idea that the fundamental flaw of modern capitalism came from its banking and financial structure (Simons, 1948). Taken together, Lange’s model of a possible socialism and Simons model of the ‘good financial society,’ represented the central features of Minsky’s ideal economic system,’ from which he would later analyse and criticise existing economic structures (Mehrling, 1999). After a sabbatical in 1969-70, Minsky seemed to view himself as Keynesian, seen through his assessment of certain fundamental institutional issues. Afterwards he became opposed to not only to monetarism but also to mainstream Keynesianism (Minsky, 1972).
Financial Instability Hypothesis
Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis mainly draws from Keynesian ‘General Theory’, which has identified “the capital development of the economy” as an economic problem rather than, “the allocation of giving resources among alternative employments”. As a detailed illustration, Minsky emphasises that the exchange of present money for future money is representative of the capital development of capitalist economy in the present day (Minsky, 1992).
Minsky has identified that the capital development of a capitalist economy provides a range of possibilities to build up financial fragility, which is why, in Minsky’s opinion, it is necessary to provide regulations and interventions. This notion is a synthesis of two fundamental arguments by Adam Smith and John Keynes about the result of market processes. We can see these two fundamental views about the outcome of a market economy have been achieved. One of them, as stated by Adam Smith, is as follows:
“As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention” (Smith, 1776, IV, Ch 2).
Keynes has interpreted Smith’s legacy of invisible hands in these days as speculatory behaviour, which is practically implemented by debtors and lenders in guarantee loans. In opposition to Smithian speculation, Keynes states his legacy of the alternative to the invisible hand – comparative static approach to economics. Keynes wrote:
“If I may be allowed to appropriate the term speculation for the activity of forecasting the psychology of the market, and the terms of enterprises for assets over their whole life, it is by no means always the case that speculation predominates over enterprise. As the organization of investment markets improves, the risk of the predominance of speculation does however, increase. Speculators do no harm as bubbles on a sea of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes the by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill done” (Keynes, 2008, 142).
According to Minsky, in designing and advocating policies and practices, economists are likely to have to choose between Smithian and Keynesian theories, Smithian theory being that the market “always” leads to the promotion of the public welfare, and the Keynesian theory that market processes “may” lead to poor capital development of the economy (Minsky, 1991). The only answer to the “invisible hand” conjecture is to apply appropriate regulations and interventions, if the results of poor capital development are serious (1992b). The financial instability hypothesis was used to explain the great financial construction of the United States in the 1932-1933, where the United States faced a crisis in the savings and loans of the banking system (Minsky, 1992b). According to Minsky, the phenomena of changes in the institutions combined with the ordinary approach and bad performances of private and public decision makers has become vital to weaknesses, which often suggests promises of an overall theoretical perspective to current troubles always leading up to these problems (Minsky, 1977, 140).
The system of capitalist economy evolved in the mid 1960s; this was a period of financial innovation, well known as the era of financial markets. The first serious test of financial innovation came in 1966 in the municipal bond market and the second in 1970 with a run of commercial paper – but each of these was determined through prompt central bank action (Minsky, 2008). Financial innovations are related to what has come to be known as Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, which has allowed an existing quantity of high-powered money to support greater expenditure. Innovations allow “a pyramiding of liquid assets” to replace cash, government bonds, or short term bank debt in portfolios. This increases the instability of the system since failure by only a few large firms (financial or non-financial) to meet debt commitments can lead to an increase in failures as assets are written-down (Fazzari & Papadimitriou, 1992). According to Thomas Palley (2009), Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis supports the reasoning that capital financial systems have an inherent proclivity to financial fragility, and that this proclivity can be summarised in the maxim “Success breeds success breeds failure” or “Success breeds excess breeds’ failure”.
Minsky’s framework is one of evolutionary instability and it can be thought of as resting on two different cyclical processes. The first cycle can be labelled the “basic Minsky cycle” while the second can be labelled the “super-Minsky cycle.”
The basic Minsky cycle concerns the evolution of patterns of financing arrangements, and it captures the phenomenon of emerging financial fragility in business and household balance sheets. The cycle begins with “hedge finance” when borrowers’ expected revenues are sufficient to repay interest and the loan principal. It then passes on to “speculative finance” when revenues only cover interest. Finally, the cycle ends with “ponzi finance” when revenues are insufficient to cover interest payments and borrowers are relying on capital gains to meet their obligations.
The basic Minsky cycle offers a psychologically-based theory of the business cycle. Agents become progressively more optimistic, which manifests in increasingly optimistic valuations of assets and associated revenue streams and willingness to take on increasing risk in belief that the good times are here forever. This optimistic psychology afflicts both borrowers and lenders and not just one side of the market. That is critical because it means market discipline is progressively removed.
This process of rising optimism is evident in the way business cycle expansions tend to generate talk about the “death of the business cycle.” In the 1990s there was talk of the “new economy” that was supposed to have killed the business cycle by inaugurating a period of permanently accelerated productivity growth. In the 2000’s there was talk of the “Great Moderation” that claimed central banks had tamed the business cycle through improved monetary policy based on improved theoretical understanding of the economy. This talk is not incidental but instead constitutes evidence of the basic Minsky cycle at work. Moreover, it afflicts all, including regulators and policymakers. For instance, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke himself indicated in 2004 that he was a believer in the Great Moderation hypothesis.
Debt Deflation or Over-Indebtedness
In the Keynesian view, over-protection during good times can be a result of crisis in the savings and loans and the banking system, a consequence of sectoral indebtedness by running out of the ability of sectoral cash flows to validate the contracts (Minsky, 1991).
Keynes ‘general theory’ also contained some elements of the financial instability hypothesis, provided by political economists such as Irving Fisher with his classical description of debt deflation. In Fisher’s argument, over-indebtedness is the only factor that disturbs general economic equilibrium. He also assumed that at some point in time a state of over-indebtedness will exist, which will tend to lead to liquidation, through the alarm either of debtors or creditors or both (Fisher, 1933).
Minsky’s analyses on Fisher debt-deflation has several emphasis, one being that debt-deflation occurs only while investment and capital assets are financed as economies have the benefit of an extended period of good times. Minsky also identified improvements in the market; like alterations in institutions, which is compatible with new instruments such as communicating and computing, is one aspect of the way financing changes over extended periods of good times. However, in Fisher’s theory of debt-deflation, he did not explain how over-indebtedness developed (Minsky, 1994).
Minsky also states that finance allows for a much faster growth of income and capital accumulation but, at the same time, increases the stock of debt, and the associated financial commitments affects the level of expected cash flows (Gatti & Gallegati, 1990). Over-indebtedness also tends to constrain investment by business and debt-financed consumption households. The United States economy was at that time burdened by a deadweight government debt accumulated as a result of the dreadful abuse of the government budget during the 1980’s, an abuse which is continuing today. These conditions mean that a recovery from the current recession will not be accompanied by buoyant private demand (Minsky, 1992b).
Hedge, Speculative and Ponzi Finance
Which factors determine the importance of borrowers and lenders risk in establishing the level of investment? To address that question, Minsky distinguishes non-financial firms according to whether they are what he terms hedge, speculative, or ponzi units (Pollin, 1997).
As mentioned above, hedge financing has a normal cash flow large enough to meet both principle and interest that is due on debts. Speculative financing has the income of the debtor large enough to meet the interest but not principle payments and Ponzi financing takes place when not enough is earned to meet even the interest due on debts. Speculative finance involves rolling over debts and Ponzi finance involves the capitalisation of interest (Minsky, 1991).
Essentially, a Ponzi collapse is a debt crisis: when there is too much debt accumulated by an economic agent, and there is no way to either get the resources to pay the debt including interest, postpone the payments, or shift the debt on to someone else, economic agents such as debtors and lenders will face bankruptcy (Nesvetailova, 2008). According to Jan Kregel of the Levy Institute, the types of debt are critically related to the way risk has been valued, assessed, and modelled by banks and financial institutions since the liberalisation reforms were introduced in the 1980s (Kregel, 2008).
So, now comes the question, can debt-deflation theory with the help of Ponzi pyramids units explain the recent financial crisis? Yes, indeed, because oversupply of housing was exacerbated when interest rates were increased and hundreds of thousands of lower middle income borrowers in the United States could no longer afford their mortgage payments, (Gupta, 2008). Moreover, the diversification of collateral debt obligations into rating CCC which targeted the sub-prime level market meant that mortgages could not be re-sold because prices had dropped (Jarvis, 2009).
Cushions of Safety
Numerous analysts have distinguished the relevance of Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis to understanding the current crisis in the financial systems of developed countries. Central to Minsky’s analysis of financial fragility was the concept of a cushion of safety, an initiative related to the prominent security analyst and hedge fund investor Benjamin Graham cited in (Calandro, 2009).
The “cushion” covers the margin of error in anticipated returns from an investment project. Minsky analysed the investment decision from the point of view of the difference between prospective cash receipts and cash commitments that represent the margin of safety. For instance, the margin of safety for a banker lending to a businessman for a particular project would be determined by the difference between the amount loaned and the amount required to finance the project. The margin could also be determined by realisation of the value of the collateral required of the borrower, the amount of compensating deposits, or any other factor that the banker believed would allow him to recover his loan if future income from the project disappointed expectations (Kregel, 2008).
According to Jan Kregel (2008), financial fragility increased by a deliberate and unnoticeable erosion of margins of safety in the relative normal circumstances. He states that this situation can be drawn to holding-up payments, suffering borrowing, or even distress transactions of inventory and productive assets. In these activities sometimes, the banker may propose re-possession of the collateral behind the loan.
The result is a debt deflation process in which “position has to be sold to make position” and the downward pressure on prices raises real debt burdens. Lower prices increase the necessity to sell and reinforce the excess supply, making it even more difficult for the investor to fully repay his/her loan from asset sales (Kregel, 2008).
Minsky describe the weaknesses of banking institutions, which are usually better informed about the overall market environment and potential competitors, and are inherently sceptical of the borrower’s estimate of future cash flows and thus insist on margins of safety. The problem of declining margins of safety is because in the earlier 1980s there was an introduction of neoliberal concepts, well known as the “Washington consensus”. This original concept was written by Friedman and Hayek (Legge, 2009), and promoted by the Reagan and Thatcher governments. One of the central ideas is financial deregulation. Before the arrival of the neoliberal approach to economic thinking and policy, very strict regulations were applied by Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (Rosenblum, 2003). This regulation was to restrict the commercial banks from affiliating with firms “engaged principally” in potential profitability activities, such as underwriting and dealing in securities. Since the Washington consensus, the commercial banks have urged relaxation of these and other constraints on their ability to enter new markets and new lines of business (Tarullo, 2008). As a result, for the first time in 1987 the Federal Reserve authorised an exemption on such a subsidiary and the first securitised investment vehicle was created the following year. Financial deregulation and liberalisation, so highly praised a decade ago, turned out to be a dangerous beast, and has gotten out of hand of the public authorities. According to the data from the Deutsche Borse Group, the current Over the Counter (OTC), about 84% of all trade in financial derivatives take place in the markets, not in regulated exchanges (Tarullo, 2008, 6).
Recent Financial Crisis
Let’s see if Minsky can explain the recent crisis which happened in the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States. Subprime mortgages represented an average of 8 percent of all loans in the 2001-2003 period, rising to an average of 20 percent in the 2005-2006 period, when over 80 percent of such mortgages were securitised with an average value of approximately $450 billion per annum (Randdal, 2007). This increase supports one of Minsky’s argument which is that “finance allows for a much faster growth of income and capital accumulation but, at the same time, increases the stock of debt” (Gatti & Gallegati, 1990).
According to the Congressional Budget Office of the United States, sub-prime mortgages account for more than half of expected credit losses and are now forecast in the range of $300 billion to $400 billion. However, since 2005 after rates have been counted for two years, this amount rose to roughly $1.5 trillion (2008, 23). If house prices fell by 30 percent, these figures would double, but not including additional defaults. In addition, there has been an unexpected increase in prime mortgage defaults that could bring the total credit losses to nearly $900 billion as a high estimate (Kregel, 2008). These dynamic figures have shown that the losses would be distributed among borrowers, creditors and banks. This phenomena is reflected in the theory of debt-deflation or over-indebtedness in which “the rise of debt-deflation can only happen while investment and capital assets are financed as economies have the benefits of an extended period of good times” (Minsky, 1994).
The financial instability hypothesis also supports the credit view of money and finance by Joseph Schumpeter (1934). In 1911 Schumpeter argued that the services provided by financial intermediaries , which are mobilising savings, evaluating projects, managing risk, monitoring managers, and facilitating transactions, are essential for technological innovation and economic development (King & Levine, 1993).
Schumpeter characterised the banker as the ephor of developing capitalist economies. At an earlier meeting of the Schumpeter Society, Minsky characterised central bankers as the “ephor of the ephors” of capitalism (Minsky, 1994). In 1797 – 1800, the Bank of England was suspended because of the war of inflation in which the Bank of England had obligations to cash notes in gold, which resulted in a great impact on prices and foreign exchange rates (Schumpeter, 1939).
According to Schumpeter, Keynes, in order to overcome the malfunctions of capitalism, broke down the conventional belief that saving, as a part of the bourgeois scheme of life, and unequal distribution of income and wealth, as a necessary evil for progress, were social virtues. This was, Schumpeter declared, the essence of the Keynesian Revolution. However, this renouncement of support for these values was the most basic non-economic factor leading to the fall of capitalism (Moss & Schumpeter, 1996).
There is no doubt that Minsky took some lessons from Joseph Schumpeter’s theories on credit, money and finance, as Minsky’s basic ideas to construct institutional structures reflects legislation, administrative actions, and the evolution of institutions and traditions that represented the past behaviour of market participants. The legislation reflects the understanding of the economy as maintaining economic theory, which was a rule among policy establishment at the time the institutions were created (Minsky, 1994). Minsky also emphasised that law and policy makers needed to be aware of institutional evolution which means sometimes bankers change their monetary policy which can lead to serious disruptions in investment and profit flows (Minsky, 1991).
This essay has presented and discussed a number of elements of economist Minsky’s theories on capitalist economy and economic systems in general. Minsky’s basic hypothesis is that capitalist economies are fragile, unstable and unbalanced. When capitalist economy gets to a stage that it is basically financed by debt, as per his financial instability hypothesis, the risk of plunging into crisis becomes great. Capitalist economic systems increased greatly in instability and fragility since 1987 with the collapse of securitisation of the home mortgage market. Minsky’s theories are therefore intimately related to the global financial system collapse two years ago, which was a cause of over-indebtedness, particularly in the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States.
In particular this essay has discussed elements of Minsky’s “financial instability hypothesis” and how it relates to the recent financial crisis. The two main elements that have been presented are that of “debt-deflations” and “cushions of safety”, backed up by a discussion of the related elements of “Ponzi Pyramids” and “Structural Institutions”. The paper has discussed how the evolution of Minsky’s theories have been grounded in the original theories on economic systems and capitalism of John Maynard Keynes and Adam Smith, one of which was critical of and the other in favour of capitalism. Essentially, Minsky sides with Keynes in purporting that a capitalist system must be grounded by regulation and intervention, to prevent it from becoming unstable. A market which is allowed to reign free is inherently unstable, leading to crisis.
In assessing how Minsky’s theories relate to the recent global economic crisis, a discussion of the elements of hedge, speculative and ponzi finance have been used to support the theory of debt-deflation, related to his financial instability hypothesis. The conclusion here is that indebtedness, an essential element of free market capitalist economy, is intimately related to the collapse of the market in the United States in 2008. Cushions of safety, another element of Minsky’s financial instability theory, has also been shown in this paper to be related to a neoliberal economic model that warrants no regulation or interference and hence the market is free to govern as it likes, resulting in a lack of any form of security should things go wrong, as happened in the recent financial crisis. Finally, institutional structures were discussed as one aspect of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. As a result of the above detailed analysis, it can be concluded that Minsky’s economic theory of financial instability can be related to much of what occurred in the 2008 global financial crisis, in particular the sub-prime mortgage market collapse in the United States.
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Movement against the occupation of the timor sea (MKOTT) Public Declaration about the Accusations Against "Witness K" and Bernard Collaery by the Australian Government
MOVIMENTU KONTRA OKUPASAUN TASI TIMOR
Díli, 17 September 2018
Public Declaration about the Accusations Against "Witness K" and Bernard Collaery by the Australian Government
MKOTT has organized this public declaration in relation to the accusations against Timor-Leste’s two comrades in struggle, Bernard Collaery and Witness K, who on the 12th of September attended their hearing at a court in Canberra, Australia. These two friends of ours are accused of informing the public about Australia espionage which involved installing a bugging device at the Timor-Leste Government Palace, with the purpose of listening in on strategic meetings of the Government of Timor-Leste, in relation to the Maritime Boundary negotiations in 2004.
Today we present more than 1300 signatures on this ten metre white banner, signatures which we can say represent the people of Timor-Leste’s solidarity to our comrades Bernard Collaery and Witness K. This solidarity message reminds us of the history which are forefathers have told us, about the 60 000 Timorese who died defending their fellow soldiers, Australian troops, during the Second World War from1942-1945.
In memory of those heroes who died in the Second World War;
1. MKOTT strongly condemns the accusations against comrades Bernard Collaery and Witness K. The accusations are an embarrassment to a nation that is known to promote freedom of expression and democracy. MKOTT is disappointed in its large neighbour, Australia, which continues to exploit its neighbours. MKOTT believes that the charges that have been laid are intended by the Australian government as a warning to others that may wish to expose the actions of the Australian government towards its neighbours.
2. MKOTT appeals to the Australian court to throw out the charges against comrades Bernard Collaery and his client Witness K, because the courts are supposed to safeguard witnesses and condemn behaviour such as espionage, not the opposite.
3. MKOTT fully supports the initiative of Andrew Wilkie MP, Senator Nick McKim, Senator Rex Patrick no Senator Tim Storer, members of the Australian Parliament, who have requested an investigation into the ASIO espionage case.
4. MKOTT wishes to propose that the Federal Prosecutor General of Australia open an investigation against the former Foreign Minister of Australia Alexander Downer who is currently on the Advisory Board of Woodside, as it was under Alexander Downer’s mandate, together with former Prime Minister John Howard, that the espionage occurred.
5. MKOTT continues to gather signatures from the people of Timor-Leste to continue to give our solidarity to our comrades in struggle Bernard Collaery and Witness K, and we will present these signatures at the next hearing on 28 October 2018. We continue to provide our advocacy and support towards the campaign to throw out the charges against our two colleagues and friends.
Viva Comrade Bernard Collaery..!!
Viva Comrade Witness K..!!
Viva Povu Maubere..!!
Komparasaun entre ekonomia Marxismo no Neoclassical; Analiza ba diferensia entre individualista no klasse iha ekonomia
Analiza ba diferensia entre individualista no klasse iha ekonomia;